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I. INTRODUCTION 
What is old is new. Twenty-five years ago, commentators were 
declaring originalism dead.1 Yet today the law reviews are positively 
awash with it. The New Originalism.2 Semantic Originalism.3 
Pragmatic Originalism.4 Redemptive Originalism.5 Even “Simple-
minded Originalism.”6 Nor is the trend limited to the academy. In 
one of the most anticipated decisions of recent years, District of 
Columbia v. Heller,7 all nine Justices joined originalist opinions, 
including a majority opinion one prominent academic originalist has 
 
  Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. J.D., Stanford Law School, 
2005; B.A., University of Wisconsin, 2000. I thank Anuj Desai, David Schwartz, and Brad 
Snyder for helpful comments. Special thanks to my father, William Coan, whose probing 
questions were the inspiration for this work. 
 1. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
611 (1999) (“The received wisdom among law professors is that originalism is dead, having 
been defeated in intellectual combat sometime in the eighties.”); Sanford Levinson, Law as 
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 378 (1982) (“I think it is fair to say that [textualism and 
originalism] are increasingly without defenders, at least in the academic community.”).  
 2. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).  
 3. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper, Paper No. 
07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.  
 4. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007). 
 5. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427 (2007).  
 6. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism (San Diego Legal Studies Paper, Paper 
No. 08-067, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1235722. 
 7. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
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called “the finest example of . . . ‘original public meaning’ 
jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”8 In light of this 
resurgence, the chief arguments for and against originalism are ripe 
for critical re-examination.  
The following dialogue provides such an examination. For the 
most part, the arguments it presents are not new. But until now, 
they have been scattered through a voluminous literature, spanning 
several decades. One purpose of this dialogue is simply to collect 
them in a single place. A second purpose is to examine them afresh, 
which, for long-running debates like this one, is worth doing at least 
a few times every generation.9 To this end, I have made one of my 
fictional interlocutors an intelligent layperson, reasonably well 
informed about history and politics, but unafraid of asking questions 
a lawyer (not to mention a constitutional theorist) might be inclined 
to dismiss as obvious. The result is to refocus attention on three 
central factors that have received too little discussion in the recent 
literature: the extreme age of most constitutional provisions; the 
extreme difficulty of constitutional amendment; and the need to 
justify legal arrangements—including constitutional arrangements—
by reference to consequences. Many subsidiary issues are cast in a 
new light along the way. 
Like Henry Hart’s classic dialogue on the power of Congress to 
control federal jurisdiction, my goal is “not to proffer final answers 
but to ventilate the questions.”10 As will soon be obvious, however, I 
do not pretend to anything like perfect neutrality.11 
 
 8. Randy Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 
27, 2008, at A13. 
 9. Cf. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An 
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 897–98 (1984).  
 10. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363 (1953).  
 11. One more proviso while I am at it: this dialogue covers a broad range of arguments 
for and against originalism, but it does not purport to be a comprehensive survey of the 
originalism literature. Among other important topics, it does not address Lawrence Lessig’s 
notion of interpretive translation, Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1165 (1993), or Jack Balkin’s similar notion of text and principles, Jack M. Balkin, Abortion 
and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). It also does not address 
internecine disputes among originalists about the proper object of originalist interpretation—
intent, understanding, meaning, etc. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 6; Solum, supra note 3; 
Whittington, supra note 2. Finally, it only glancingly addresses arguments that the 
indeterminacy and multivocality of original meaning render originalism infeasible or worse. See, 
e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. 
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II. INTERPRETATION 
Q: What is originalism, anyway? 
A: That is complicated. Very briefly, originalists believe that 
judges should interpret the Constitution to mean what it was 
understood to mean at the time it was ratified. In fact, many 
originalists argue, originalism is the only approach deserving of the 
name “interpretation.”12 Judges employing other approaches don’t 
mine the Constitution for meaning, as interpretation implies; they 
make their own. 
Q: That seems dead on. When historians interpret the Articles of 
Confederation or the Declaration of Independence, they are 
interested in the meaning of those documents at the time they were 
drafted.13 Why should constitutional interpretation be any different? 
Of course, other people might be interested in the meaning of those 
documents to contemporary Americans. But that’s a sociological 
inquiry, not an interpretive one.  
A: So many originalists claim. But this is argument by 
definitional fiat. It is an attempt to resolve a normative debate about 
how judges should decide constitutional cases through redefinition 
of a normatively charged term—in this case, interpretation.  
Q: I’m not sure I follow. 
A: It’s like this. There is broad agreement that judges should 
interpret, rather than make, the law. Thus, by redefining 
interpretation to include only originalist interpretation, originalists 
appear to answer the normative question of how judges should 
decide constitutional cases. But it is only an appearance. Their 
argument sheds no light on the actual normative question at issue, 
which is how we should want judges to decide constitutional cases.  
Q: So the agreement that judges should “interpret” the 
Constitution really masks disagreement about what interpretation 
means? 
A: Exactly. And that disagreement cannot be resolved by 
reference to a contested definition.  
 
COMMENT. 159 (1996); Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A 
Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 636–37 (1985).  
 12. See Barnett, supra note 1; Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 
15 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997); Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-
Wing Law Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006).  
 13. Alexander, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
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Q: That makes sense, but I still don’t understand why the 
definition is contested. In every other context I can think of, 
interpretation of a written document involves the search for some 
kind of original meaning—either the intended meaning of the 
original author or the meaning that a text or statement would have 
conveyed to its original audience.  
A: That is because, in most contexts, the goal of the interpreter 
is to discover some kind of original meaning. That is the whole point 
of reading a recipe or a grocery list or, in most circumstances, the 
Articles of Confederation. The goal of judges interpreting the 
Constitution is different. Their decisions have real consequences—
for the actual litigants before the Court, for other affected citizens, 
and for the separation of powers. Moreover, a constitutional decision 
of the Supreme Court can be overridden only by an extremely 
onerous process of constitutional amendment. This makes 
constitutional interpretation a whole different ball of wax. 
Q: That’s what I’m afraid of. I don’t want a Constitution made 
of wax. The whole point of putting it in writing was to fix its 
meaning against the whims of subsequent generations. If judges feel 
free to depart from that meaning in the name of “interpretation,” we 
may as well have no Constitution at all.  
A: Well, you’re in good company. Chief Justice Marshall made a 
similar argument in Marbury v. Madison.14 And in recent years, a 
number of prominent originalists have argued that an originalist 
interpretive approach follows logically from “our commitment to a 
written Constitution.”15 But this is a mistake. Nothing—or virtually 
nothing—follows from the writtenness of the Constitution. One can 
be committed to a written constitution in any number of ways for 
any number of reasons, the vast majority of which do not entail an 
originalist interpretive approach. 
Q: Like what? Stripped of its original meaning, the Constitution 
is no more than a bunch of squiggly marks on a page. 
A: Well, to take just one example, we can be—and in fact, are—
committed to the constitutional text as a useful focal point for legal 
coordination. We need some basic and stable ground rules just to get 
government off the ground—the basic structure of the three 
 
 14. 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803). 
 15. Balkin, supra note 5, at 429; Barnett, supra note 1, at 636; see also KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL 
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).   
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branches, a division of powers among them, the manner of selecting 
representatives, etc. Within broad limits, it is more important that 
these questions be settled than that they be settled right. And since 
the Constitution is already in place and enjoys wide support, it is the 
best candidate for doing so.16 
Q: This just proves my point. In order to serve as a basis for 
coordination, the text must have a fixed and determinate meaning. 
That’s an argument for originalism. 
A: A fixed and determinate meaning is certainly helpful in this 
context. But strictly speaking, it could just as easily be contemporary 
as original meaning. More important, most of the Constitutional 
provisions that primarily serve a coordination function are sufficiently 
precise that there has been little change in their meaning over time. 
I’m thinking specifically of things like the presidential age 
requirement, equal state representation in the Senate, proportional 
representation in the House of Representatives, and the procedures 
for appointing and confirming federal judges. 
Q: That’s a pretty small subset of the constitutional text. 
Certainly, there are many constitutional provisions that no one 
would describe as precise. What reason could a nonoriginalist 
possibly have for adhering to those?   
A: There are lots of reasons. Even an imprecise constitutional 
text can serve as a useful platform for common law reasoning—a 
framework for judges to fill in and reshape over time in light of 
changing social needs.17 An imprecise constitutional text can also 
serve as a locus of normative discourse in a flourishing constitutional 
culture—at least when it embraces as many inspiring, but ill-defined 
ideals as the American Constitution does.18 In fact, one might even 
regard imprecision, instability, and malleability in the hands of 
judges as the Constitution’s central virtue—a reason for 
constitutional losers to remain committed to the system in the hopes 
of prevailing another day.19  
 
 16. See David Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 
YALE L.J. 1717 (2003). 
 17. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877 (1996); see also Strauss, supra note 16. 
 18. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003). 
 19. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009  9:59 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
852 
The key question, as I emphasized earlier, is how we should want 
judges to decide constitutional cases. Our “commitment to written 
constitutionalism” may mean that we are unlikely to accept an 
answer that does not accord some role to the constitutional text. But 
all plausible theories—not just originalism—do that. The writtenness 
of the Constitution can therefore provide no ground for choosing 
originalism over other plausible contenders. 
III. DEMOCRACY 
Q: Surely, there is more to be said for originalism. 
A: Yes, different originalists subscribe to the theory for different 
reasons. Another common one is that the original meaning of the 
Constitution is the only meaning the People have democratically 
endorsed.20 But the People who endorsed the Constitution’s 
original meaning are long dead, at least in the case of most 
constitutional provisions, and in most cases were also exclusively 
white, male, and economically well-off. This is known as the “dead-
hand problem.” Why should the People of today be stuck with a 
Constitution adopted by our long-dead ancestors, and such a narrow 
stratum of them at that?21  
Q: Just out of curiosity, do critics of originalism feel that a 
narrow stratum of our ancestors forced their values on the public at 
large? Has anyone gone back and looked at the opinions of the 
general public in 1789? It would be interesting to know what kind of 
constitution we might have had if a broader spectrum of interests 
had been consulted.  
A: It is very difficult to measure public opinion from 220 years 
ago with any confidence. Certainly, at least the provisions on slavery 
(or lack thereof) would have been different had blacks participated in 
the ratification process as equal citizens. Women would likely have 
 
 20. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143 
(1990); WHITTINGTON, supra note 15, at 110–59; Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original 
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 
226, 234 (1988). 
 21. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 11 (1980); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY RADICAL RIGHT WING 
JUDGES ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 74–76 (2005); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204–38 (1980); Michael Klarman, Antifidelity, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997).  
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been allowed to vote had they participated. But beyond that, it is 
difficult to say.  
In the end, the breadth or narrowness of the Constitution’s 
support at the founding is a secondary issue. The main issue is that 
everybody who voted to ratify the Constitution is dead and has been 
for a long time. None of them had seen a car or a telephone or an 
electrical outlet, much less an M-16 or a Predator drone or a 
neutron bomb.22 It would be crazy to consider ourselves bound by 
their understanding of the blueprint they laid out for us.  
Q: Maybe. But aren’t you forgetting about Article V? If we think 
the original meaning is crazy, why don’t we just amend it?   
A: Yes, originalists make exactly that point. Original meaning is a 
constraint on judges, they say; the People are free to amend the 
Constitution any time.23 But this freedom is largely illusory. The 
deck is so heavily stacked against amendment—and stacked not by us 
but by the very dead ancestors whose grip amendments are supposed 
to shrug off—that the Constitution is, in almost all important 
respects, frozen in its current form.24  
Q: But we’re not constrained by a bunch of dead white guys. 
We’re constrained by the generation that came after them and the 
generation after that and the one after that, and so on. After all, the 
generation of 1810 could have changed the constitution. It chose 
not to. The generation after that could have changed it but did not. 
And so on up to the present day. I think it’s silly to say that we, 
today, are constrained by dead guys from 1787. 
A: To be really precise, we are constrained by a majority of dead, 
property-holding white guys circa 179025 and the small minorities of 
every generation since that were sufficient to block the many changes 
to the Constitution that majorities of those generations supported. 
At least we would be so constrained, if the Supreme Court had 
subscribed to a rigid originalist theory of interpretation throughout 
our history. Fortunately, it has not.  
Consider the Equal Rights Amendment, which easily passed in 
both houses of Congress and the legislatures of 35 states, 
 
 22. See Klarman, supra note 21, at 384–85. 
 23. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 20, at 170–71. 
 24. Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 237–
40 (1995). 
 25. The Constitution was ratified in 1788 and the Bill of Rights in 1791.  
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representing a large majority of the national population, but still fell 
three states short of ratification.26 Measured by modern standards, 
the ERA has a much stronger democratic pedigree than the 
Constitution itself, almost all of which was ratified before women 
could vote. But it is the Constitution, not the ERA, that remains 
law. At least, this would be the case if originalists had their way. In 
fact, nonoriginalists on the Court have read much of the ERA into 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27   
Still, the ERA does not make a perfect club with which to flog 
originalism. Even if the Court had not read gender equality into the 
Equal Protection Clause, the amendment’s supporters would be free, 
with a few minor exceptions, to pursue the same goals in the 
legislative arena. So long as these goals command majority 
support, originalist judges present no obstacle to their 
achievement; should they cease to command majority support, that 
cessation—and not originalist judges or the onerous amendment 
process—will be the cause of their demise.  
But such isn’t always the case. The ERA would have imposed on 
state and federal governments constraints not imposed by the 
Constitution’s original meaning, constraints whose ultimate goals 
could for the most part be achieved equally well through democratic 
self-restraint. Other amendments, by contrast, would free the 
democratic process from constraints placed on it by the 
Constitution’s original meaning and enforced by originalist judges.  
Q: This suggests a thought experiment. What ideas have lost 
popular support today but continue to be protected by originalist 
interpretations of the constitution? What ideas have lost popular 
support at other periods of our history but continued to be 
protected? 
A: One example from today: state sovereign immunity—the 
originalist notion that unconsenting states should be immune from 
 
 26. See generally DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER, 
AND THE POLITICS OF ERA 55–65 (1990); GILBERT YALE STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1985).  
 27. Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) (“The Court 
began to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in ways that were responsive to the 
amendment’s proponents—so much so that scholars have begun to refer to the resulting body 
of equal protection case law as a ‘de facto ERA.’”). 
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suit by individual citizens whose rights they have violated.28 We can 
be reasonably sure sovereign immunity has lost popular support, 
since Congress has voted to override it in so many modern statutes.29 
At the founding, however, a Supreme Court decision that threatened 
states’ immunity was greeted by massive outrage.30 
One example from an earlier historical period: the Child Labor 
Amendment, which would have overturned unpopular originalist 
restrictions on federal power to regulate child labor. The amendment 
was passed by Congress in 1924 but, despite broad popularity, was 
ratified by only twenty-eight states—eight short of the three-fourths 
required by Article V.31 As a consequence, a whole generation of 
children labored in the fields and factories before the Court 
ultimately reversed itself in 1941.32  
Q: Would we be better off today if the Constitution had allowed 
for amendment by a 51% majority? What if the Constitution retained 
its super-majority requirement for amendment, but the decision 
would be made by direct vote rather than through the medium of 
state legislatures? 
A: The latter would be an improvement; I don’t know about the 
former. The track record of states that allow relatively easy 
amendment of their constitutions by referendum or initiative is 
certainly not encouraging. They pass too many amendments, 
which are frequently stupid, in part because voters are evaluating the 
proposals in a vacuum.33 So on balance I don’t think I would favor 
such an easy amendment procedure. As I hinted earlier, the Supreme 
Court does a pretty good job of adapting the Constitution to the 
times and keeping it in accord with large-scale trends in public 
opinion.34 It could stand to be a little more deferential to 
 
 28. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996). 
 29. See statutes challenged in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721 (2003); Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); 
and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  
 30. Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise: Modern Textualism and 
State Sovereign Immunity, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135 (2009). 
 31. HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 74–81 (2002). 
 32. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court first held federal 
regulations of child labor unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 33. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 293. 
 34. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); Gregory 
A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/3/2009  9:59 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
856 
the democratic branches, but that’s a fairly minor complaint. Given 
the institutional constraints it operates under, the Court, I believe, is 
for most purposes a better mechanism for updating the Constitution 
than a 51% rule would be.  
Q: Another thought experiment: What would the differences be, 
starting today, if all originalists were purged from the Supreme 
Court and never allowed to return? What would the differences be if 
they had been purged in 1860? 1910? 1935? 
A: That is a great question, though it is basically impossible to 
answer. Nonoriginalists are too diverse a group. For example, if you 
replaced Scalia and Thomas, the only committed originalists on 
today’s Court, with clones of John Roberts and Samuel Alito, 
relatively little would change. Most of the time, their conservative 
brand of judicial pragmatism leads them to the same results Scalia 
and Thomas embrace on originalist grounds. This illustrates a very 
important point. Knocking down originalism is only the beginning. 
One still has to decide what to recommend in its place.  
Q: Forget about originalist judges for a moment. Let’s 
remember that Robert Byrd carries a copy of the Constitution in his 
breast pocket at all times.35 Is he an anachronism? Or do his 
constituents appreciate this behavior? Or is it both? 
A: The Constitution is a religious object as much today as at any 
time in our history, so I don’t think Byrd is an anachronism. It is 
also a genuinely wise document in many respects, from which 
present-day government officials can still learn a great deal. What is 
unhealthy is the view that the founding generation was blessed with 
“a wisdom more than human,” and that its understanding of the 
Constitution ought therefore to be treated with “sanctimonious 
reverence . . . too sacred to be touched.”36 To paraphrase Thomas 
Jefferson, whom I have just quoted: The founding era was very like 
the present, but without the experience of the present; and 200 years 
of experience in government is worth a millennium of book reading; 
and this the founders would say themselves, were they to rise from 
the dead.  
 
POL. SCI. 635 (1992); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2596 (2003).  
 35. See Carl Levin, Tribute to Senator Robert Byrd, http://levin.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/release.cfm?id=256972 (last visited Aug. 28, 2009). 
 36. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), available at 
http://classicliberal.tripod.com/jefferson/kercheval.html. 
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Q: Actually, in my own case any reverence I feel toward the 
Constitution is based on the principles it embodies, not on the fact 
that it was adopted in any particular way. 
A: This is orthogonal to debates over originalism. Plenty of 
nonoriginalists think many of the founders’ principles are intrinsically 
attractive; I certainly do. But originalism says we should be bound 
not just by the constitutional principles we find intrinsically attractive 
but to every aspect of an eighteenth century understanding of the 
constitutional text. Originalists cannot defend the results this would 
produce to a mainstream contemporary audience, so they have to 
appeal to the higher principle of democracy. What they always fail to 
mention, of course, is the virtual impossibility of amending the 
Constitution to conform to the wishes of contemporary democratic 
majorities.  
IV. CONSTRAINING JUDGES 
Q: Okay, fine. You have convinced me that originalism cannot 
be readily defended by reference to the Constitution’s democratic 
pedigree or by the definition of interpretation. But, as you conceded 
up front, those are hardly the only arguments for originalism. 
A: That’s true. Originalists do have another string to their bow. 
Without the constraints imposed by original meaning, they argue, 
the Supreme Court would become a “naked power organ”37 whose 
decisions the politically accountable branches could neither influence 
nor reverse. 
Q: Better a naked power organ than a cloaked one, I say. But 
honestly, I don’t see how the power exercised by the Justices is 
affected one way or the other by the nature of their deliberations. If 
the judges condemn me to death on the basis of original meaning, is 
that less powerful than condemning me to death on the basis of their 
personal convictions? 
A: If judges can decide cases only how and when original 
meaning authorizes them to, they are less powerful than if they can 
decide cases how and when they personally see fit. This is unlikely 
to comfort you, the condemned, since the Constitution’s original 
meaning places few limits on the power of judges to impose the 
 
 37. The epithet originated with a nonoriginalist, Herbert Wechsler. Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1959).  
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death penalty.38 But originalists think it should comfort the People 
who want to kill you, since they can be sure originalist judges won’t 
stand in the way, even if those judges personally oppose capital 
punishment.39 
Q: I think you have misinterpreted my point, which is that 
power derives from the Court’s relationship to society and to the 
other branches of government, not from its methodology. I grant 
that the Court’s methodology, or more particularly, the results it 
arrives at, can influence the Court’s relationship to society and to the 
other branches of government. But in an individual case, what the 
court says goes, regardless of methodology. 
A: It is true that in individual cases what the court says goes, 
barring unusual behavior by the other branches or the extreme case 
of popular revolt. But it’s also true that if judges feel constrained to 
act in accordance with original meaning, they are in a real sense less 
powerful—in individual cases and across the run of cases—than if 
they feel free to decide cases as they personally see fit. Think of the 
originalist judge as a well-trained Doberman on a leash and the 
nonoriginalist a feral pit-bull. Both have fearsome jaws, but one is 
clearly scarier than the other.  
At least, that’s how the originalists see it. Critics would point out 
that nonoriginalist judges are also leashed—by the constitutional 
text, public opinion, legal culture, periodic appointment of new 
Justices, and the Court’s dependence on Congress and the President 
to carry out its decisions. Moreover, unlike the originalist’s leash, the 
nonoriginalist’s leash is not tied to the fixed post of original meaning 
and then abandoned; it is held by a sentient—albeit not 
extraordinarily attentive—master, who can yank on the Court’s 
choke collar should a toothsome infant crawl by, or flee to a different 
neighborhood if there’s a flood or an earthquake, or let out some 
more line if the crime rate rises. But I am getting ahead of myself. 
Q: How so? 
A: Well, the critics have several responses to the judicial-restraint, 
or rule-of-law, argument for originalism, and it makes sense to 
consider them in order. First, they note that this is a consequentialist 
argument. That means its power depends not on any overriding 
 
 38. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 46 (1997). 
 39. Id. at 41–42. 
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political principle (like democratic legitimacy) but on the costs and 
benefits, broadly defined, of adopting an originalist theory of 
interpretation. This observation changes the whole complexion of 
the debate. It means that originalists must show that 
the consequences of adhering to original meaning are better than the 
consequences of alternative approaches, systemically and in 
individual cases.40 Seen in this light, most people—including some 
originalists—would think the costs of a rigid originalist philosophy 
unacceptably high. Such a philosophy might well permit the 
segregation of public schools and other public facilities;41 bans on 
inter-racial marriage;42 all manner of racial covenants in the sale of 
private property;43 bans on the sale of contraceptives;44 and, quite 
possibly, established state churches.45 Perhaps worse, it might 
invalidate social security; federal bans on discrimination in 
employment and public accommodations; federal minimum wage 
laws; and the entire modern administrative state (on which more 
later). Almost no one, including Justice Scalia, believes that 
adherence to original meaning on these issues would exceed the 
costs of departing from it.46  
Q: What’s the second point? 
A: That original meaning is itself a very weak constraint on 
judicial decision-making. On most controversial questions, the 
original meaning of the constitution is ambiguous, so it is easy for 
judges to find support in the history for whatever position they are 
predisposed to favor on policy grounds. In fact, in many contexts, 
the history invoked in originalist opinions gives an insidious veneer 
 
 40. See Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges 
Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 167 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A 
Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234, 2236 (2006).  
 41. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Michael Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1881, 1884 (1995). 
 42. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Edward Gary Spitko, Note, A Critique of 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s Approach to Fundamental Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337, 
1358–59 (1990). 
 43. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 15–17 (1971). 
 44. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Bork, supra note 43, at 7–11.  
 45. See Newdow v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. 1, 51 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 46. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861–62 
(1989). 
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of objectivity and passivity to judicial decisions that are in reality the 
product of political choices, unconscious or deliberate.47 If 
we dispensed with originalist rhetoric, judges would be forced to 
defend these choices on their own terms, to everyone’s benefit. The 
result might actually be a more cautious Court, since once it was 
clear to everyone that many of the choices in constitutional cases are 
political, it would be more difficult for the Court to justify making 
those choices itself, rather than deferring to the political branches. 
Shall I continue? 
Q: Sure. We might as well get the whole argument on the table. 
A: The third point—and the final one—is that original meaning 
is far from the only imaginable means of constraining judicial 
discretion. For example, instead of following original meaning, 
courts could adopt a strong presumption that all validly passed laws 
are constitutional. This was Oliver Wendell Holmes’s favored 
approach. He called it the puke test—a law was unconstitutional only 
if it made him want to vomit.48 It is also known as Thayerism, after 
its first prominent proponent, Professor James Bradley Thayer.49 
Whatever you call it, this approach limits the power of judges at least 
as severely as originalism—a law must be patently unconstitutional 
before a Court will strike it down—but it is likely to yield superior 
practical consequences for obvious reasons. The present-day 
majorities to whom it defers are likely to be a far better gauge than 
the Constitution’s original meaning of core national values, not to 
mention the solutions required by modern social and economic 
problems.  
Q: I don’t want to be ruled by core national values. Think of the 
“seditionists” who went to prison in the early twentieth century 
merely for expressing an opinion that the United States should stay 
out of World War I. Think of how our core national values have 
changed from 1965 to 2005. 
A: Too bad. You’re going to be governed by them. The only 
question is whether they’ll be the core national values of the 
 
 47. See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39–45 
(2005); cf. Andrew B. Coan, Text as Truce: A Peace Proposal for the Supreme Court’s Costly War 
Over the Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511(2006) (noting appearance of 
political decision-making in disputes over Eleventh Amendment’s original meaning). 
 48. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 23, 1926), 
reprinted in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 888 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).  
 49. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1893). 
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1790s (or the late 1860s, when the Civil War amendments were 
adopted) or the core national values of today (as interpreted by the 
democratic branches) or the core national values of a group of 
unelected judges “tuning” the Constitution to the times as they see 
fit. The middle alternative sounds best to me, though given the 
institutional constraints that keep courts basically in line with public 
opinion, the third certainly sounds better than the first. You might 
agree if you consider that the first sedition act was passed in 179850 
by the founders themselves and that political dissidents did not 
receive robust protection under the First Amendment until the late 
1960s.51  
Q: I guess it depends on what you mean by “core” national 
values. My point is that I don’t want to be thrown in prison for 
offending 51% of the population. Of course, I don’t want to be 
thrown in prison for offending 75% of the population (or 90% of the 
population) either, but my point is that I want the Constitution to 
protect me when I’ve offended 51–75% or 51–90% of the 
population, but not the whole population and not the “core” 
national values theoretically enshrined in the Constitution.  
A: So there is one core value you want the Constitution to 
embrace—your right to walk into the local library carrying a sign 
that says “Fuck the Troops and Your Idiotic Yellow Ribbons Too.” 
Or perhaps you’d prefer to paint this on the back of a leather 
jacket.52 In any case, the next question—and the fundamental one—
is what approach to constitutional interpretation is most likely to 
protect this and other values you would like the Constitution to 
protect, without unduly restraining government power to promote 
the general welfare? The answer cannot be originalism, which would 
protect few of the constitutional freedoms you hold dear (remember 
that many of the framers voted for the Alien and Sedition Acts) and 
saddle the country with an eighteenth century government most ill-
equipped to deal with today’s constitutional challenges. 
Q: Okay, you made your point. But I am still concerned about 
the oppression of despised minorities. I don’t want judges to defer to 
legislatures that do the oppressing. But I don’t trust them to their 
 
 50. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, July 14, 
1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 5. 
 51. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 52. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
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own devices either. What do you do about a problem like segregated 
swimming pools?   
A: I’m glad you asked. Another approach to judicial self-restraint 
is the theory of famous constitutional law scholar John Hart Ely, 
who urged the Court to defer to democratic institutions except 
where the actions of those institutions undermine the integrity of the 
democratic process. Ely favored aggressive judicial review of speech 
restrictions, burdens on the franchise, and racial discrimination—all 
of which have the potential to distort the democratic process and so 
cannot be trusted to it alone—but virtually complete deference on 
other questions. His theory provides one non-originalist answer to 
your question about segregated swimming pools. Since this 
segregation was a part of a concerted effort to brand blacks as 
second-class citizens and exclude them from political and social 
life, Ely’s view was that courts owed such laws none of the deference 
usually accorded to the actions of democratic institutions.53   
Another answer to your question, the answer James Bradley 
Thayer would give, is that we cannot trust judges with questions of 
racial justice any more than we can trust them with other kinds of 
questions.54 It is safer to leave all such questions to the democratic 
process. This answer seems much less drastic in light of recent 
scholarship convincingly demonstrating that decisions like Brown v. 
Board of Education did relatively little to improve the plight of 
southern blacks. Substantial progress in dismantling Jim Crow, it 
turns out, was achieved only with the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964,55 ten years after Brown.56 Lawrence v. Texas, the sodomy 
law case of a couple years ago, is another example of courts’ limited 
ability to effect social change. In fact, the Court’s decision in 
Lawrence may have done gays more harm than good, since the fears 
it stoked on the religious right were a major catalyst for the rash of 
state bans on gay marriage.57 The sodomy laws that Lawrence struck 
 
 53. ELY, supra note 21. 
 54. See Thayer, supra note 49. 
 55. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (1964). 
 56. MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–442 (2004); GERALD ROSENBURG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42–71 (2d ed. 2008).  
 57. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 
431 (2005). 
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down, by contrast, remained on the books in only a handful of 
states, which rarely if ever enforced them.58  
Returning to the question of constraint, yet another view 
emphasizes the many institutional constraints under which courts 
operate, quite apart from theories of constitutional interpretation. 
The more notable of these are legal culture and the institutional 
weakness of courts relative to Congress and the president. Legal 
culture values tradition, precedent, and incremental change, all of 
which tend to make courts cautious about breaking new ground. 
The institutional weakness of courts, in particular their powerlessness 
to enforce their own decisions, forces them to husband their public 
image carefully. This, in turn, causes their decisions to track public 
opinion quite closely, certainly much more closely than does the 
original meaning of the constitution. This last claim, as I mentioned 
earlier, is backed by decades of empirical evidence.59  
Q: And yet, when we think of the majesty of the Court, we think 
of those cases where it has resisted public opinion, do we not? 
A: This is not as true as you might think. A surprising number of 
the Court’s most admired decisions—including its crown jewel, 
Brown v. Board of Education—were supported by national 
majorities.60 Perhaps more important, the converse is equally true. 
The two most maligned decisions in the Supreme Court’s history—
Dred Scott v. Sandford61 and Lochner v. New York62—were unpopular 
at the time they were decided. The bottom line is that the Court 
very rarely gets very far out ahead of public opinion, nor does it 
often lag far behind. When it does either, the bad results, historically 
speaking, have arguably outweighed the good. This is especially true 
when those results are evaluated from a liberal perspective, which 
makes conservative attacks on the Supreme Court and liberal 
defenses of it somewhat ironic.63  
Q: This is certainly food for thought. Let’s review what we’ve 
covered. 
 
 58. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 
1861–2003 (2008). 
 59. See supra note 34. 
 60. Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 18, 21 (Nathan Persily et al. eds., 2008). 
 61. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 62. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 63. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999). 
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A: Sure. To summarize: deprived of its democratic pedigree and 
fallacious definitional arguments, originalism is forced to justify itself 
on practical grounds. It attempts to do this by emphasizing the need 
to constrain the power of judges but fails to make a persuasive case 
that original meaning is the best constraint. Judge Richard Posner 
illustrated this point beautifully in his classic essay “Bork and 
Beethoven.”64 The concept for the essay grew out of a single issue of 
the conservative magazine Commentary that coincidentally contained 
two articles on originalism. One of the articles was a piece 
ridiculing a quixotic school of musical thought that favors the use of 
original arrangements and period instruments in performances 
of composers like Beethoven. The author’s perspective: the music 
sounds terrible, so why should we listen to it? The other article was a 
piece praising Robert Bork’s originalist judicial philosophy, which 
Bork defends on the same two grounds we have just discussed, 
democratic legitimacy and the need to constrain judges. I am sure 
you can see where this is going. After demolishing the democratic 
legitimacy argument, Posner simply posed the music critic’s 
question: if the original meaning of the Constitution sounds terrible, 
why should we listen to it?  
Q: If what sounds terrible, democratic majorities or the 
constraint of them? 
A: The constraints imposed by original meaning. Of course, the 
way I phrased this leaves open the question—sounds terrible to 
whom? The answer is to democratic majorities, which may make it 
seem like my critic would never favor constitutional constraints. 
When, after all, will a democratic majority ever like the sound 
of limits on its own power? Surprisingly often, it turns out. People 
are fully capable of supporting unconstitutional legislation one 
moment and the constitutional principles that make it so the next. 
Really serious problems arise only in the relatively rare circumstance 
when the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is so 
out of step with the public’s wishes that the public finds the results 
intolerable. When this happens, the Court, not the People, should 
yield. As Dean Larry Kramer is fond of saying, the Court is 
the People’s servant, not the other way around.65 
 
 64. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990). 
 65. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 248 (2004).  
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V. CONSEQUENCES 
A: Here is a greatly simplified way to think about the point I’ve 
been trying to articulate: in order for originalists to show that 
originalism is the best theory of constitutional interpretation, they 
need to convince us that we’ll like the Constitution it yields better 
than the Constitution we’d get under plausible alternative 
approaches. This is the essence of what I have been calling 
consequentialism and what Judge Posner calls pragmatism. Seems 
pretty simple, right? How else would you demonstrate the 
superiority of a theory of Constitutional interpretation? But many 
originalists want no part of it. They refuse to defend original 
meaning on the merits. They do so partly because they believe 
original meaning is the command of the sovereign People, which 
judges are without authority to disobey. They also believe that 
adhering to original meaning without regard to consequences will 
produce better consequences in the long run than allowing judges to 
consider consequences in some or all circumstances. The former, as I 
hope I have demonstrated, is a fallacy of the first order. The latter is 
plausible and logically coherent, and if true, may require an 
originalist judge like Justice Scalia to ignore consequences in 
deciding individual cases. But it cannot absolve Scalia, the 
constitutional theorist, of the responsibility to convince us that we’d 
actually like an originalist Constitution better than its rivals. That is 
his basic burden.  
So we’re back to my original point: Would we like an 
originalist Constitution better than the Constitution we could expect 
to end up with under any of the nonoriginalist approaches sketched 
earlier? Perhaps the question is sharper in reverse: Would we 
expect nonoriginalist judges of every stripe to produce 
a Constitution worse than one that permits Jim Crow segregation; 
criminal punishment of political dissent, blasphemy, and 
pornography; official state religions; blanket bans on abortion; and 
most kinds of sex discrimination, all while dramatically limiting the 
power of the federal government to deal with problems of a truly 
national scope like the environment and social security? If yes, we 
should be originalists; otherwise, not.  
Q: Would Scalia accept this burden, or would he argue that it is 
the People’s burden to decide what they like and want? By “the 
People,” of course, I mean whatever percentage of people it takes to 
amend the Constitution. Might not Scalia argue that the People 
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would have risen up and amended the Constitution more often if 
Supreme Court Justices had consistently adhered to originalism? 
A: Who in the world would such an argument persuade? Only 
someone who believes (a) that 10–25% of the People have an 
absolute moral right to block changes to the system of government 
devised by our long dead ancestors; or (b) that original meaning is so 
close to ideal (and judges so mistake-prone) that it’s better to permit 
changes only when they are supported by 75–90% of the People.66 
Note that, where judges deviate from original meaning, opponents 
are just as free to override the decision by amendment as they would 
be if it were based on original meaning; the difference is that the 
nonoriginalist default is the decision of relatively recently appointed 
judges rather than long-dead popular majorities. For reasons we have 
already discussed, (a) strikes me as a completely wacky view. 
Some serious people, including Scalia, do believe (b), though their 
courage almost always fails them in key situations (e.g., school 
segregation, interracial marriage, free speech, affirmative action67). I 
don’t believe (b) and I don’t think most ordinary citizens would 
either if they gave it serious thought. But that is not the essential 
point. The point is that the case for originalism stands or falls based 
on the relative desirability of the Constitution it would produce. This 
is almost tautological. Why would you favor originalism if you 
believe some other theory would produce a better Constitution, all 
things considered?   
Q: I don’t see anything wrong with this in principle, but 
apparently we’ll never know what amendments might have been 
made under an originalist tradition, since you argue that the 
Supreme Court has in effect amended the Constitution on its own 
throughout our history. 
A: No, and we’ll never know which necessary changes wouldn’t 
have been made (though there are some we can be pretty sure 
 
 66. A negative vote in one house of thirteen state legislatures is sufficient to block any 
proposed amendment. And this is on top of the requirement of a two-thirds majority in both 
houses of Congress. As a practical matter, this means that amendment is impossible without 
support from a very substantial supermajority of the public. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW 
THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 20–21 (2007); Lutz, supra note 24, at 257–60. 
 67. Justices Scalia and Thomas both have joined numerous opinions holding affirmative 
action unconstitutional without any mention of original meaning, which does not seem to have 
prohibited affirmative action. See Marvin Lett, Grutter, Gratz, and Affirmative Action: Why No 
“Original” Thought?, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 417 (2005).  
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about). We have to make an educated guess whether the 
consequences of a rigidly originalist Court would have been better or 
worse. My strong feeling is worse.  
Q: To what extent does this depend on the difficulty of the 
amendment process? What if, as I suggested earlier, the Constitution 
could be amended by a simple 51% majority? Would originalism still 
be fatally flawed, in your view?   
A: I would not use the term “fatally flawed.” Originalism would 
be much more defensible in this situation. In fact, it would be a 
downright plausible approach. But where a provision is sufficiently 
old (or even if it is not old is responsive to a factual context that has 
radically changed since the provision was ratified) and its 
consequences sufficiently bad in the eyes of recently appointed 
judges (even after accounting for the benefits of stability in the law), 
a meliorative judicial construction would still be appropriate. Even a 
relatively lenient 51% amendment rule is costly—both in terms of the 
resources required to mobilize public support and the risk that the 
amendment will fail despite popular support (perhaps because too 
few resources could be collected to raise the issue to the fore of 
public consciousness). This means that, other things being equal, we 
should favor the judicial approach most likely to render amendment 
unnecessary.68 In the situation I’ve just described, pragmatism is a 
better bet than originalism. If pragmatist judges get it wrong—as 
they inevitably will in some cases—the costs would be relatively 
small; a 51% vote would be sufficient to overturn their decision.  
Q: I don’t feel I have a horse in this race, but I am puzzled by 
the concept of pragmatism or consequentialism. In order to justify a 
decision based on its outcome, don’t you need a scale that allows 
you to weigh outcomes? What is that scale? 
A: You’re right that a scale is necessary—and not only that. In 
the constitutional context, justification depends on empirical 
assumptions like the relative competencies one attributes to state and 
federal governments; courts and legislatures; etc., as well as 
normative issues like the importance one assigns to rights like 
freedom of speech and equal protection; whether one believes these 
rights should be protected no matter what or balanced against other 
government interests; and a myriad of similar considerations. Most 
 
 68. Cf. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR 
LEGISLATION (2008); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 133–
34 (1994). 
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pragmatists take a broadly utilitarian view on these questions 
(meaning, roughly, that they think the Constitution, like other law, 
should be formulated to maximize social welfare). But one need not 
accept this view to accept the consequentialist point I’ve been 
making about constitutional interpretation. That point does not 
depend on one’s ultimate view about what the Constitution 
should mean. It depends only on the more modest claim that a 
theory of constitutional interpretation must be justified with respect 
to ultimate views; it cannot be self-justifying. This means that 
proponents of originalism cannot duck the responsibility to defend 
the Constitution an originalist approach would yield. To do so is to 
forfeit the debate.  
Q: Another thought experiment: what language would you have 
to incorporate into a constitution so that originalism would never be 
an issue? For example, could you incorporate references to 
community values? That way, the Constitution would automatically 
live and breathe as community values live and breathe. Would any 
society ever embrace such a constitution? What would be the 
outcome if it did? 
A: To answer your second question first, sure you could 
incorporate references to community values; arguably the 
Constitution already does (in the Eighth Amendment69 and the Due 
Process clause70). But it would be a bad idea to incorporate them in 
any extensive way, since judges have no special training or talent for 
discerning community values and their mistakes are harder to correct 
than the mistakes of legislatures. That’s why many pragmatists cast a 
jaundiced eye on decisions like Roe v. Wade71 and Roper v. Simmons72 
(which bans the execution of criminals who committed their crimes 
as minors).73 As for your first question, you can never completely get 
rid of the originalism issue, since whatever language you used to do 
so would itself have to be interpreted. But you might be able to 
force the originalists to judge more pragmatically by writing in a 
provision requiring judges to interpret the Constitution according to 
the theory I’ve been advocating. 
 
 69. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 70. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952). 
 71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 72. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 73. See Posner, supra note 47. 
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Q: This all strikes me as distressingly anti-democratic. Are you 
really arguing that judges should just decide cases in accordance with 
the Constitution they personally think best?   
A: Not exactly. My discussion of consequentialism has 
really been addressed to the question: what kind of judges should 
ordinary citizens want their President to appoint and their Senators 
to confirm? The answer is that they should support the kind of 
judges who they think most likely to interpret the Constitution as 
they, the citizens, would like it to be interpreted. As Posner wrote in 
the conclusion to “Bork and Beethoven”:  
In a representative democracy, the fact that many (it need not be 
most) people do not like the probable consequences of a judge’s 
judicial philosophy provides permissible grounds for the people’s 
representatives to refuse to consent to his appointment, even if 
popular antipathy to the judge is not grounded in a well thought 
out theory of adjudication. The people are entitled to ask what the 
benefits to them of originalism would be, and they will find no 
answers in [Robert Bork’s] The Tempting of America. 74   
It may be that originalism’s proponents can yet persuade the 
people that these benefits exist. And if they do so often enough, 
maybe they’ll get a truly originalist Supreme Court. But I don’t see 
this happening. Virtually no one would like the music.  
VI. STABILITY  
Q: It seems to me we are still missing something. I am reminded 
of the old adage that business can cope with any tax code the public 
decides to impose. What it can’t cope with is capricious change, 
because in that case there is no way to assess risks, and business can’t 
move forward except by assessing risks.  
A: This is an undeniably important point, though it is one to 
which consequentialism is quite sensitive. Stability is an important 
goal of the legal system and pragmatist judges take it into account in 
deciding cases.  
Q: I’m not persuaded. Even if pragmatist judges individually pay 
attention to the relative importance of stability, they are bound to 
have different ideas about it. If this is true and if pragmatism tells 
them to follow their best all-things-considered judgment, it seems 
 
 74. Posner, supra note 64, at 1382. 
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likely to create a great deal of systemic instability. I am beginning to 
think the case for originalism stands on the concept that government 
is impossible without some stable ground rules, and no one would 
be able to agree on any ground rules if the rules were understood to 
have no fixed meaning.  
A: Some originalists do make this argument, but there is an 
obvious response: after two centuries of nonoriginalist judging, a 
return to pure originalism would generate massive instability in the 
legal system. All kinds of settled expectations would be upset. 
Q: I don’t like the sound of that. But maybe short-term 
instability is the price we have to pay for long-term stability. If your 
house was built on a foundation of quicksand, you wouldn’t hesitate 
to replace it with concrete, even if that meant tearing the house 
down.  
A: We’ve never had a consistently originalist Supreme Court, but 
we haven’t sunk into the quicksand yet. Pragmatist judges aren’t 
stupid or reckless. They understand the importance of stable ground 
rules as well as anyone. That’s why they consider the Constitution’s 
original meaning, and especially its original purpose, as an important 
factor in deciding constitutional cases.75 They also take precedent 
seriously, especially where it has induced public reliance. But unlike 
originalists, pragmatists understand that stability is a matter of degree 
and in some cases must give way to other goods.  
Q: No one would have ratified the Constitution if the meaning 
had been understood to be provisional. Or maybe they would have, 
but they would have insisted on knowing what the provisions were.  
A: No one who ratified the Constitution seriously expected it to 
remain in force for 220 years. Their most recent example of a 
“perpetual” constitution was the Articles of Confederation, which 
collapsed after less than a decade. Even if the founders had expected 
the Constitution to survive two centuries, they certainly wouldn’t 
have wanted—at least they shouldn’t have wanted—its content to 
remain constant unless 75–90% of the population approved 
changes.76 That would simply have been foolish. Ultimately, 
though, what Americans of the founding generation wanted is beside 
the point. They are no longer the ones who have to live with the 
 
 75. See Richard Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
165 (2008).  
 76. Cf. ELHAUGE, supra note 68, at 9–10 (making a similar point in the context of 
statutory interpretation). 
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Constitution they ratified; we are. That means the relevant question 
is what method of constitutional interpretation will make the 
Constitution work best for us. The answer is one that carefully 
weighs the benefits of stability and clarity, the relative competencies 
of judges and other government bodies, and likely consequences of 
adopting one Constitutional rule or another. This is the approach 
that eleven generations of Americans have developed for keeping the 
Constitution current and have lived with tolerably well. Given the 
practical impossibility of invoking the stringent Article V amendment 
procedures, it is the provision I would endorse. Justice Scalia’s many 
departures from a rigid originalist interpretation suggest this is the 
view he really endorses, too. He just attaches greater value to 
stability, defers less to legislatures, and most important, likes 
the content of original meaning more than I do. 
Q: I am coming around. 
A: Wait, there is more. On top of everything we have discussed, 
there are plenty of questions originalism can’t answer; maybe more 
than it can. And it is not just that original meaning is fraught with 
ambiguity (in the abstract and as applied). Even where everyone 
agrees what the Constitution requires, it is often difficult or costly 
(sometimes to other constitutional values) to determine whether 
those requirements have been violated. And whatever approach the 
Court adopts will produce systematic errors—either over-enforcing 
or under-enforcing the Constitution, or both. Put more 
dramatically, the Court has to choose—in every constitutional 
context—whether to err on the side of forbidding constitutional 
government action (as it does in Miranda v. Arizona,77 which 
excludes evidence from confessions obtained without the required 
warning, though the Fifth Amendment requires merely that a 
confession be voluntary)78 or on the side of complicity in 
constitutional violations (as it would if it abandoned Miranda’s 
warning requirement, knowing that courts would admit some 
unconstitutionally obtained confessions as a result).  
Another example: everyone agrees that a bill only becomes law if 
it passes both houses of Congress and is signed by the President. But 
how should the Supreme Court determine whether this has 
 
 77. 396 U.S. 868 (1969). 
 78. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2004). 
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occurred?79 (This may seem like a fanciful question, but it is the 
subject of a famous Supreme Court case.)80 There are a number 
of plausible approaches. The Court could refuse to enforce a law 
whenever it believes that the law probably did not pass through the 
constitutionally required procedures. It could apply the standard of 
proof from criminal cases, striking down laws only where there is no 
reasonable doubt the procedures were defective (or the reverse—
upholding laws only where there is no reasonable doubt they were 
properly passed). Or it could do what it actually has done, which is 
to conclusively presume that all bills certified by the speaker of the 
house have been validly passed into law. There are good reasons for 
this presumption, not least of which that it will generally square with 
the facts. It will also minimize judicial interference with 
congressional self-governance. But there’s also no question that it 
will cause the Court to enforce the occasional constitutionally 
defective law. Sometimes there is a clerical error in the bill the 
speaker certifies. One can even imagine the Speaker of the House 
sneaking in some extra pork for her district while no one was 
looking. But the Court has decided that the costs of identifying these 
violations—both the risk of error, which would nullify legitimately 
passed laws, and the intrusion on congressional self-governance—
exceed the benefits. This is a quintessentially pragmatic calculation, 
one of many that virtually no one questions the Court’s right to 
make.81  
Q: The more I think about it, the more originalism seems like a 
trivialization of the much larger question of how the Justices—to 
invoke a golf metaphor—should address the ball. 
A: Exactly. There is a rigidity and formalism to the normative 
thinking behind originalism that parallels the rigidity and formalism 
of originalist interpretation. Much of originalist argument seems 
premised on the notion that we must either accept the original 
meaning of the Constitution as binding law or reject the 
Constitution altogether. But constitutional law is not an all or 
nothing proposition. We can accept original meaning as authoritative 
for some purposes and not for others. We can treat the text not as a 
body of fixed and determinate rules, but as a site of contestation in 
 
 79. See id. at 72–74. 
 80. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 81. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 132–33 (2001). 
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constitutional culture or a flexible framework for common-law 
constitutionalism or a hundred other things. Nor should we forget 
that the constitutional text, however interpreted, is far from the only 
constraint on judicial decision-making and probably not the most 
important. Theories of interpretation are simply one aspect of a 
larger social practice of constitutional adjudication, in which legal 
culture and the Court’s weak institutional position play an important 
constraining role. They must be considered in light of that practice, 
and like the other aspects of it, they must be justified by reference to 
their consequences. 
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